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INTRODUCTION: LAYOFFS AND OLDER WORKER PROTECTION
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, between December
2016 and December 2017, around 1.6 million workers in the United
States were laid off or discharged each month.1 When employers are
faced with the decision to reduce workforce size, which occurs even
during stronger economic times, numerous legal issues arise if the
reduction is not executed properly.2 Federal and state law govern the
workforce reduction process, but certain classes of workers receive
more protection than others.3
Older workers have received considerable protection over the past
fifty years through the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (“ADEA”), which makes it illegal to discriminate against
employees over the age of forty due to their age.4 Even under the
ADEA, an employee may waive an age discrimination claim if such a
waiver is “knowing and voluntary.”5 Waivers of claims occur when
companies offer departing employees severance payments in
exchange for those employees relinquishing their rights to sue the
company over certain types of claims.6 In essence, when an employee
1. See Table 5, Layoffs and Discharges Levels and Rates by Industry and
Region, Seasonally Adjusted, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Feb. 6,

2018), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/jolts.t05.htm [http://perma.cc/4W8K-SGKX].
2. Executive Legal Summary 396, Reductions in Force, Westlaw (database
updated Dec. 2017).
3. See id.
4. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202 (codified
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012)).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) (“An individual may not waive any right or claim under
this chapter unless the waiver is knowing and voluntary.”).
6. See Whiteford, Taylor, Preston LLP, Severance Agreements: Drafting Tips to
Make Sure They Stick – Part 1, MD. EMP. L. LETTER (Sept. 2009).
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signs a severance agreement, he agrees not to assert any legal claims
against the employer, marking the end of their employment
relationship.7 Severance agreements are powerful tools that “buy[ ]
peace” for the employer and can mean additional compensation for
the employee.8 Some employers have historically taken advantage of
these tools, going as far as manipulating or coercing employees into
waiving their ADEA rights for the security of obtaining a signed
agreement, knowing the employee can never sue again.9
To combat this, Congress amended the ADEA by enacting the
Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990 (“OWBPA”), which,
in part, clarified what it meant for an employee to “knowingly and
voluntarily” waive an age discrimination claim.10 The OWBPA reiterated that ADEA waivers must be “knowing and voluntary,” a
contract term that sets the standard for what it means to consent to
something by ensuring that the signee understands that it is his or her
choice whether or not to enter into an agreement and requiring that
such a decision is voluntary and is made knowingly.11 Importantly,
the OWBPA includes a unique series of specific notice and
information requirements as necessary elements for a waiver to
qualify as knowing and voluntary.12
The need for employee protections became clear during the
economic recessions of the 1970s and 1980s.13 In an attempt to
remain compliant with the 1978 ADEA amendment that prohibited
arbitrary terminations of older workers, employers began offering
special early retirement deals known as “golden handshakes,” which

7. MICHAEL DELIKAT, ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, STRATEGIES IN
DRAFTING EFFECTIVE SEPARATION AGREEMENTS 2 (2008).
8. Id.
9. S. REP. NO. 101-79, at 968 (1989) (“Other older workers who testified before
the Subcommittee on Labor described signing waivers without knowing or
understanding the facts of any claim they might have.”).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 626; 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22 (2017).
11. See generally Romero v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 01-3894, 2016 WL 2619853, at
*7 (E.D. Pa. May 4, 2016) (denying Allstate’s request for a new trial because the jury
instructions regarding OWBPA compliance, in which Plaintiffs argued that
determining whether a release was signed “knowingly and voluntarily” required
giving employees a “meaningful choice,” were not misleading: “If the ordinary
contract principle of procedural unconscionability mandates a showing of
‘meaningful choice,’ it is logical the ‘more stringent’ voluntariness standard under the
totality of the circumstances test would have to meet, at a minimum, the same
standard.”).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(A)–(H).
13. Jonathan Peterson, Early Retirement: The Golden Handshake—or Shove?,
L.A. TIMES (June 7, 1985), http://articles.latimes.com/1985-06-07/news/mn-15975_1_
early-retirement/2 [http://perma.cc/P6HK-JH9K].
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were cash inducements for older workers to retire.14 These take-it-orleave-it inducements put pressure on employees, because they were
given little time to decide if they should sign up, and made older
workers, even those who could not afford to do so, feel like they had
to retire.15 Older workers affected by these programs had little
reason to suspect that the severance packages they were offered could
have been an act of unlawful age discrimination under the ADEA.16
During this same time period, older workers were also generally
unable to tell whether they were selected for an involuntary
Reduction in Force (“RIF”) program based solely on their age, which
is per-se age discrimination.17 The OWBPA offers older employees
enhanced protection against these types of discrimination.18
This Note will evaluate the first twenty-five years of practice under
this novel federal statutory approach to waiving rights, suggest areas
for improvement, and demonstrate how the OWBPA could act as a
model for discrimination claim waivers in other statutory settings.
Though this Note argues that the OWBPA has provided a higher
level of protection to older workers, the OWBPA has not completely
remedied the issue of age discrimination in the United States.19
There is still room for improvement, particularly through clarification
of select OWBPA waiver provisions.
Part I describes the background of the OWBPA. Part II examines
the statutory ambiguity that has arisen since the passage of the
OWBPA, and how courts have attempted to clarify this ambiguity.
Part III proposes that the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) can reinterpret select elements of the
OWBPA and suggests a legislative amendment to other anti-

Id.
Id.
Id.
See generally Virginia L. Hardwick & Tiffanie C. Benfer, Proving Disparate
Treatment in a Reduction in Force: Ideas to Help Plaintiff’s Counsel Demonstrate
Pretext, AM. BAR ASS’N, Nov. 4, 2011, at 1, https://www.americanbar.org/content/
14.
15.
16.
17.

dam/aba/administrative/labor_law/meetings/2011/ac2011/017.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3P77-TFP3]. See also Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120,
130 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating the evidence of an involuntary RIF must lead the
factfinder to reasonably conclude either (1) the defendant consciously refused to
consider relocating or retaining a plaintiff because of his age or (2) that the defendant
regarded age as a negative factor in such consideration).
18. See generally GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CTR., EARLY RETIREMENT
INCENTIVE PLANS AND THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT (2010).
19. See Liz Ryan, The Ugly Truth About Age Discrimination, FORBES
(Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/lizryan/2014/01/31/the-ugly-truth-aboutage-discrimination/#316ce0471f1e [http://perma.cc/TXE9-PGXX].

2018]

FOR CLARITY’S SAKE

843

discrimination laws that would codify the knowing and voluntary
standard in a similar way to how it is codified under the OWBPA.
The purpose of this Note is to act as a starting point to spark
conversation about raising the bar of the knowing and voluntary
standard for waiver agreements signed by employees facing layoffs
and to show how increased disclosures can be beneficial to both
employers and employees in the workforce reduction process.
I. BACKGROUND
Under the ADEA, passed in 1967, it is unlawful to discriminate
against a person because of his or her age with respect to any term,
condition, or privilege of employment, including hiring, firing,
promotion, layoff, compensation, benefits, job assignments, and
training.20 The ADEA permits employers to favor older workers
based on age even when doing so adversely affects a younger worker
who is forty years of age or older.21 The ADEA is enforced by the
EEOC, a federal agency responsible for implementing and overseeing
federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, or genetic
information.22
In 1990, Congress passed the OWBPA, which amended the ADEA
in order to bolster the ADEA and realize its original goals, in
response to some employers manipulating or coercing employees into
waiving their ADEA rights.23 In the late 1980s, Congress grew
concerned about employers taking advantage of older workers due to
the workers’ lack of information or expertise regarding age
discrimination law, combined with the fact that older workers
increasingly became the targets of corporate down-sizing.24 To this
end, the OWBPA amended Section 7 of the ADEA to include a
20. Facts About Age Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/age.cfm [https://perma.cc/97NH-BEH3].
21. Id.
22. Administrative Enforcement and Litigation, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/enforcement_litigation.cfm
[http://perma.cc/WQT3-UNUG].
23. S. REP. NO. 101-79, at 968 (1989).
24. Id. (“2. Lack of information or expertise. Other older workers who testified
before the Subcommittee on Labor described signing waivers without knowing or
understanding the facts of any claim they might have. The demographics of costcutting are seldom shared by employers with their workforce.”); Waivers Under the

Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Joint Hearing Before the Select Comm. on
Aging & the Subcomm. on Emp’t Opportunities of the Comm. on Educ. & Labor,
101st Cong. 1003–04 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 Joint Hearing Before the Select Comm.
on Aging] (statement of Edward R. Roybal, Chairman, Select Comm. on Aging).
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statutory definition of a knowing and voluntary waiver of an ADEA
claim.25
A. The Origins of the OWBPA: Supervision Requirements
Prior to the enactment of the OWBPA, an important unanswered
question before the EEOC and federal courts was whether an ADEA
waiver had to be supervised by the EEOC or the federal courts in
order to be valid.26 Did the government need to get involved in the
contracting between employers and employees over age
discrimination concerns?
The Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), which established the
minimum wage, among other things, has such a supervisory
requirement.27 One cannot consent to work for less than what is
prescribed by the FLSA without the consent of the Department of
Labor or a court, and courts have imposed strict limitations on when
and how claims under the FLSA can be settled.28 Advocates for an
ADEA supervision requirement noted the ADEA’s incorporation of
the FLSA’s enforcement procedures, implying incorporation of its
accompanying supervision requirement.29 However, in 1986, the
Sixth Circuit rejected this argument and a supervision requirement
for the ADEA in Runyan v. National Cash Register Corp.30 The
court held that under particular circumstances, employers and
employees may negotiate a valid release of ADEA claims privately
and without government supervision.31 Further, the court noted that
the EEOC, at the time, specifically proposed guidance allowing for
unsupervised waivers with the intent of encouraging voluntary

25. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (2012).
26. Craig Robert Senn, Knowing and Voluntary Waivers of Federal Employment

Claims: Replacing the Totality of Circumstances Test with a “Waiver Certainty”
Test, 58 FLA. L. REV. 305, 313 (2006).
27. See Compliance Assistance – Wages and the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/whd/flsa/ [http://perma.cc/

H5ND-PEZ3].
28. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)–(c) (2012); Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S.
697, 704 (1945) (holding that “in the absence of a bona fide dispute between the
parties as to liability,” one cannot release one’s right to liquidated damages under
§ 16(b)).
29. See 1989 Joint Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Aging, supra note 24, at
1005.
30. 787 F.2d 1039, 1040 (6th Cir. 1986).
31. Id. at 1043.
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resolution of ADEA disputes and the court agreed with the agency’s
views.32
In 1987, the EEOC issued a final rule permitting older workers to
waive their rights without supervision.33 Justice Clarence Thomas,
the then-Chairman of the EEOC, explained in a letter to the United
States Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources that
mandating a supervision requirement impractically increases the
workload of the government while limiting an employee’s existing
choice to waive his or her rights privately, without first filing an age
discrimination complaint with the EEOC.34 The EEOC advised that
its regulation permitting older workers to waive their rights without
supervision was “adequate to protect employees against pressure to
waive their rights while preserving their choice to waive without filing
a claim with the EEOC or in court.”35
However, despite the EEOC’s assurances, Congress feared that the
EEOC’s position would not adequately protect older workers and
proposed House Bill 1432 and Senate Bill 54, which comprised the
Age Discrimination in Employment Waiver Protection Act of 1989.36
The proposed legislation provided that ADEA waivers were invalid
except when employers obtained the waiver in a settlement of an
older worker’s charge of age discrimination or where the waiver was
reviewed by a court.37
One side of the supervision requirement debate can be
demonstrated by the testimony of Chairman Edward R. Roybal of the
U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Aging. In his
opening statement in the April 18, 1989 Joint Hearing before the
Select Committee on Aging and the Subcommittee on Employment
Opportunities of the Committee on Education and Labor, he alleged
that the EEOC’s position on supervision violated congressional intent
because it permitted employers to extract the waiver of rights from

32. Id. at 1045; Senn, supra note 26, at 332–33 (“From 1986 through 1990, five
federal circuits—the Second Circuit in Bormann, the Third Circuit in Coventry, the
Fifth Circuit in O’Hare, the Sixth Circuit in Runyan, and the Eighth Circuit in
Lancaster—concluded that a person could privately waive an ADEA claim without
government supervision.”).
33. Legislative Regulation and Administrative Exemption Allowing for NonEEOC Supervised Waivers Under the ADEA, 39 C.F.R. § 1627 (1987).
34. See 1989 Joint Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Aging, supra note 24, at
1130 (letter from Clarence Thomas, Chairman, EEOC).
35. See id.
36. See id. at 1106 (statement of Edward R. Roybal, Chairman, Select Comm. on
Aging).
37. See id.
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older workers coercively due to the inherently unequal relationship
between employee and employer.38 “Employers should not be
permitted to exploit their superior bargaining position, and the
vulnerable conditions of their older employees, by forcing them to
sign away their rights.”39
The other side of the argument emphasizes that employees and
employers should be able to freely contract with each other.40 Mark
Dichter, a prominent labor and employment defense attorney,
demonstrated such a position when testifying on his own behalf
during a hearing before the Subcommittee on Labor of the
Committee on Labor and Human Resources of the United States
Mr. Dichter explained that
Senate on March 16, 1989.41
Senate Bill 54 was “unreasonable, unworkable and inconsistent with
the ADEA and the national employment policy to encourage
voluntary resolutions of potential disputes.”42
He noted that
responsible employers already ensured that employees, when given
the opportunity to sign a release, were not discouraged from seeking
the advice of counsel in connection with the release and were
provided with a reasonable period of time to consider whether or not
to enter into such an agreement.43 As his testimony was given prior
to the passage of the OWBPA’s set waiver provisions, Mr. Dichter
predicted that employers would view the knowing and voluntary
standard as inherently reasonable: “I do not believe that most
responsible employers would object to including specified language in
their releases which would inform employees of their rights under the
ADEA and encourage employees to consult with either the EEOC or
a private attorney prior to entering into the release.”44
The Supreme Court’s June 1989 decision in Public Employees
Retirement Systems of Ohio v. Betts45 interrupted the debate over
the Age Discrimination in Employment Waiver Protection Act of
1989. Betts did not concern the issue of the validity of ADEA
waivers, which makes the details of the case irrelevant to this Note. It
38. See id.
39. See id. at 1104.
40. Age Discrimination in Employment Waiver Protection Act of 1989: Hearing
on S. 54 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Labor & Human Res.,
101st Cong. 1209 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 Hearing on S. 54 ] (statement of Mark
Dichter).
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 1203.
44. See id. at 1207.
45. 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
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did, however, re-establish Congress’s opposition to age discrimination
in the employee benefits area and set the stage for the passage of the
OWBPA.46 It is important to recognize that the true genesis of the
waiver provisions of the OWBPA originated with the Age
Discrimination in Employment Waiver Protection Act of 1989.
B.

Compliance with the OWBPA Waiver Provisions

The OWBPA codified what is functionally equivalent to the
knowing and voluntary standard by establishing a two-tiered scheme
for evaluating the legal sufficiency of a voluntary waiver of an
employee’s ADEA rights.47 The first tier establishes the minimum
requirements that must be met in order for a release agreement to be
enforceable.48 The Supreme Court held in Oubre v. Entergy
Operations, Inc.49 that a waiver may not be considered knowing and
voluntary unless, at a minimum, it satisfies these enumerated
requirements.50
The second tier includes additional statutory
requirements for waivers “requested in connection with an exit
incentive or other employment termination program offered to a
group or a class of employees.”51
Before the passage of the OWBPA, courts, by default, had the
discretion to determine which factors made waivers of discrimination
claims knowing and voluntary.52 Some courts relied strictly on
traditional contract principles to determine the validity of releases,
while others required an examination of the totality of the
circumstances.53 The stringent contract approach looked to ordinary
contract principles to evaluate the legal sufficiency of waiver
agreements, such as whether proper consideration was given in
exchange for the waiver and the absence of fraud, duress, or mutual

46. Mark D. Pomfret, All Betts Are Off: How Employers Should View Older
Workers’ Benefit Protection Act, 18 J. LEGIS. 87, 88 (1992).
47. See generally U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, UNDERSTANDING

WAIVERS OF DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS IN EMPLOYEE SEVERANCE AGREEMENTS
(2009) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING WAIVERS OF DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS],
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/qanda_severance-agreements.html [http://perma.cc/
P363-A66Y].
48. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(A)–(F)(i), (G) (2012).
49. 522 U.S. 422 (1998).
50. Id. at 422.
51. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(F)(ii).
52. See Senn, supra note 26, at 310–11.
53. See id. at 309.
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mistake.54 By contrast, courts that employed the more deferential
totality of circumstances approach looked to other factors to
determine whether a waiver was entered knowingly and voluntarily.55
For example, the Third Circuit, in Coventry v. United States Steel
Corp.,56 considered the following factors when determining whether
or not ADEA-related claims were sufficiently waived:
1) the plaintiff’s education and business experience, 2) the amount
of the time the plaintiff had possession of or access to the agreement
before signing it, 3) the role of plaintiff in deciding the terms of the
agreement, 4) the clarity of the agreement, 5) whether the plaintiff
was represented by or consulted with an attorney, and 6) whether
the consideration given in exchange for the waiver exceeds
employee benefits to which the employee was already entitled by
contract or law.57

The Second Circuit adopted this totality of the circumstances
approach prior to the passage of the OWBPA.58 The court used the
factors enumerated in Coventry and added a seventh factor: whether
an employer encourages an employee to consult, or discourages an
employee from consulting, an attorney.59 The court noted that the
Third Circuit’s totality of the circumstances standard was consistent
with the congressional purpose underlying the ADEA and stressed
the need to carefully examine any situation in which an older worker
bargains away the statutory right to be free from age discrimination.60
While many of the ultimately codified requirements of the knowing
and voluntary standard were drawn from case law, academic
literature, and even other statutes,61 the OWBPA took the critical
step to make these factors mandatory. Such factors include, at a
minimum, that:
 The waiver is written in a manner calculated to be understood by
the average individual eligible to participate;
 The individual waives rights or claims only in exchange for
consideration;

54. Judith Droz Keyes & Douglas J. Farmer, Settlement of Age Discrimination
Claims—The Meaning and Impact of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act,
12 LAB. LAW. 261, 275 (1996).
55. Id.
56. 856 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1988).
57. Id. at 523 (citing DiMartino v. City of Hartford, 636 F. Supp. 1241 (D. Conn.
1986)).
58. Bormann v. AT&T Comm., Inc., 875 F.2d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 1989).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See discussion infra Section II.B.
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 The individual is advised in writing to consult with an attorney
prior to signing the agreement;
 The individual is given at least 21 days to consider the agreement
or at least 45 if in connection with an exit incentive or other
termination program offered to a group or class of employees;
 If in connection with an exit incentive or other employment
termination program offered to a group or class of employees,
the employer must inform the employee in writing and in
manner calculated to be understood by the average employee,
the class, unit, or group of individuals covered by such program,
any eligibility factors for such program, and any time limits
applicable to such program; as well as the job titles and ages of
all individuals eligible or selected for the program, and the ages
of all individuals in the same job classification or organizational
unit who are not eligible or selected for the program.62

Although the OWBPA established a framework for determining
the minimum conditions under which a waiver can be deemed a
knowing and voluntary release of one’s ADEA rights, employees
retain recourse in traditional contract defenses such as fraud,
coercion, and mutual mistake.63 In other words, if an employer
proves that all of the statutory minimums have been satisfied, then an
employee may still be able to prove that the waiver was not knowing
and voluntary.64
For example, the appellants in Bennett v. Coors Brewing Co.65
argued that the releases they signed as part of a termination program
violated the OWBPA because they were fraudulently induced into
doing so.66 Coors, however, argued that the releases were valid
because they complied with the express requirements of the
OWBPA.67 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s

62. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(A)–(H) (2012).
63. Id. § 626(f)(3) (“In any dispute that may arise over whether any of the
requirements, conditions, and circumstances set forth in subparagraph (A), (B), (C),
(D), (E), (F), (G), or (H) of paragraph (1), or subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph
(2), have been met, the party asserting the validity of a waiver shall have the burden
of proving in a court of competent jurisdiction that a waiver was knowing and
voluntary pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2).”).
64. See id. § 626(f)(1); see also Griffin v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 62 F.3d 368, 373–
74 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding “nonstatutory circumstances, such as fraud, duress, or
coercion in connection with the execution of the waiver, may render an ADEA
waiver not ‘knowing and voluntary’” and remanding the case for the district court to
consider these factors under the totality of the circumstances).
65. 189 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 1999).
66. Id. at 1228.
67. Id.
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grant of summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s age discrimination
claims, and remanded the case to consider whether the releases were
valid in light of appellant’s fraud allegation.68 The court noted that
fraud may render an ADEA waiver not knowing and voluntary, even
though Coors met the statutory minimums outlined in the OWBPA.69
In sum, the OWBPA’s strict and detailed waiver requirements
provide a presumptive, but not automatic, protection for employers.70
Even if the employer meets the above standards in subsections (A)–
(H) in a release agreement, a court could still find that the agreement
violated the OWBPA if the employee did not sign it knowingly and
voluntarily through traditional contract defenses, as seen in the Coors
case.71 Still, the extensive requirements set forth in (A)–(H) do act as
a floor from which employers must craft their release agreements.72

1.

A Decrease in ADEA-Related Charges Filed in Federal
District Court

This strict-compliance standard established by the OWBPA has led
employers to err on the side of caution when creating release
agreements to avoid what amounts to a kind of double jeopardy if the
release were to be invalidated.73 Since the Supreme Court decided
Oubre in 1998 and held that an employee’s release of claims under
the ADEA is unenforceable if the release is not compliant with
OWBPA protections, the number of EEOC enforcement suits
involving ADEA claims that were filed and resolved in federal
district courts has decreased, despite a spike in 2006.74
From 1999 until 2007, around forty ADEA-related cases were filed
and resolved in federal district court each year.75 Beginning in 2007,
the rate began to gradually decline and in 2016, only two cases were
68. Id. at 1239.
69. Id. at 1229.
70. See id. at 1229 (holding that “non-statutory circumstances such as fraud,
duress, or mutual mistake may render an ADEA waiver not ‘knowing and voluntary’
under the OWBPA”).
71. Id. at 1228–29.
72. See generally Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422 (1988).
73. Id. at 427.
74. EEOC Litigation Statistics, FY 1997 Through FY 2017, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/
litigation.cfm [http://perma.cc/7N8V-SDVH]. Fifty EEOC enforcement suits were
filed and resolved in the federal district courts in 2006 compared to forty-four in 1998,
thirty-two in 2007, and fourteen in 2015. Id. Statistics specifically regarding ADEA
waiver litigation could not be found. I assume the decrease in the number of cases
also correlates to a decrease in ADEA waiver litigation.
75. See id.
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brought.76 Without adequate research, it is difficult to determine
what caused this decrease; however, an employment attorney at a
prominent defense firm opined that (1) the Supreme Court’s Oubre
decision and (2) the EEOC’s strategic enforcement plan changes are
likely two motivating factors.77 Further, the Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”) could have led many of these cases to be resolved privately
in arbitration instead of in court.

a.

Oubre and Its Effect on Waiver Compliance

One possible reason for the decline in EEOC enforcement suits
brought in federal court is the Oubre decision.78 Oubre helped to
discipline employers into ensuring age waivers are signed knowingly
and voluntarily because if not, employers are not only vulnerable to
an ADEA suit, but also cannot claw back the original consideration
given to the employee in exchange for his or her signature on that
waiver.79 The Supreme Court in Oubre held that if a release did not
comply with the OWBPA’s requirements, it could not bar an
employee from keeping the benefits received from signing the
release, even though the release was invalidated.80 Respondent
Entergy Operations, Inc. (“Entergy”) argued that under general
principles of contract jurisprudence, before an innocent party can
elect to void the contract he entered into, he must first tender back
any benefits received under that contract.81 Furthermore, Entergy
argued that under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, a party is barred
from shirking the burdens of a voidable transaction for as long as she
retains the benefits received under it.82 Therefore, Entergy reasoned,
an employee essentially ratifies an otherwise ineffective release
agreement by retaining the consideration.83
The Court disagreed, stating that the rule proposed by Entergy
would frustrate the OWBPA’s practical operation.84 The Court
explained that it was common for a discharged employee to have
already spent the consideration money and to “lack the means to

76. Id.
77. Telephone Interview with Senior Counsel, Unnamed Law Firm (Oct. 4, 2016)
(notes on file with author).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 428 (1988).
81. Id. at 425.
82. Id. at 425–26.
83. Id. at 426.
84. Id. at 427.
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tender their return.”85 Additionally, “[t]hese realities might tempt
employers to risk noncompliance with the OWBPA’s waiver
provisions, knowing it will be difficult to repay the monies and relying
on ratification. We ought not open the door to an evasion of the
statute by this device.”86 Because employers will not be able to
reclaim consideration money given to an employee in exchange for an
invalid release, employers are likely more careful about ensuring a
valid release that is compliant with the OWBPA requirements since
the Oubre decision. This added care likely has resulted in more
compliant releases and thus, fewer complaints filed in federal court.

b.

The EEOC’s Strategic Enforcement Plan

Another possible explanation for this decrease could be the
EEOC’s strategic enforcement plan.87 The EEOC’s Strategic Plan for
Fiscal Years 2013 to 2016 had six priorities: (1) eliminating barriers in
recruitment and hiring; (2) protecting immigrant, migrant, and other
vulnerable workers; (3) addressing emerging and developing issues
(i.e. issues associated with new legislation, judicial decisions, and
administrative interpretations); (4) enforcing equal pay laws;
(5) preserving access to the legal system; and (6) preventing
harassment through systemic enforcement and targeted outreach.88
Notably absent from these priorities is combating age discrimination,
and its absence indicates that it has not been a particular focus of the
EEOC over the past five or so years. As a result, these cases are not
as attractive to the EEOC for litigation.

c.

The FAA’s Effect on EEOC Enforcement Actions

Lastly, the decrease could also be due to the United States
Arbitration Act, more commonly referred to as the FAA.89 The
FAA provides for contractually-based compulsory and binding
arbitration, setting out the legislative framework for the enforcement
of arbitration agreements and awards in the United States.90 The
FAA provides that if a party to a contract containing an arbitration
clause initiates contract-related litigation, either party can compel the
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Strategic Enforcement
Plan FY 2013-2016, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Sept. 4, 2012),
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/sep.cfm [http://perma.cc/ZH9Z-K2UZ].
88. Id.
89. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
90. Id.
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moving party to resolve the dispute through arbitration.91 Supreme
Court decisions over the last several decades have reinforced the
FAA’s pro-arbitration mandate and ensured that it is universally
applied by both state and federal courts.92 As a result of cases like
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.93 and Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams94 many ADEA claims are resolved in arbitration rather
than in court.95

2.

An Increase in ADEA-Related Charges Filed with the EEOC

Although there has been a decrease in the number of ADEArelated EEOC enforcement actions brought and resolved in federal
district court over the past ten years, there has been an increase in the
total number of ADEA-related charges filed with the EEOC.96
These statistics indicate that older workers are exercising their rights
under the ADEA and remain targets of discrimination.
In 2005, there were 16,585 charges filed with the EEOC alleging
ADEA violations—including those filed concurrently under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), and/or the Equal Pay Act of 1963
(“EPA”)—and in 2015, there were 20,144.97
According to a Pew Research Center analysis of employment data
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics from 2016, Americans ages sixtyfive and older are working more than at any time since the beginning
of the twenty-first century.98 This suggests that the increase in
charges filed under the ADEA with the EEOC is likely due, in part,
to older Americans working longer than they have in recent history.
In May 2016, 18.8% of Americans ages sixty-five and older reported

91. 9 U.S.C. § 4.
92. Claudia Salomon & Samuel de Villiers, The United States Federal Arbitration
Act: A Powerful Tool for Enforcing Arbitration Agreements and Arbitral Awards,
LEXISNEXIS (Apr. 17, 2014), https://m.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/the-us-fedarbitration-act [http://perma.cc/46XF-4773].
93. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
94. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
95. See generally Circuit City, 532 U.S. 105; Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20. See also
discussion infra Section II.A.3.
96. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY
1997–FY 2017, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/
eeoc/statistics/enforcement/adea.cfm [http://perma.cc/ZN2V-5H29].
97. Id.
98. Drew DeSilver, More Older Americans Are Working, and Working More,
than They Used to, PEW RES. CTR. (June 20, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2016/06/20/more-older-americans-are-working-and-working-more-than-theyused-to/ [http://perma.cc/7XKQ-RKHY].
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being employed full or part-time as compared to 12.8% in May 2000.99
These statistics indicate that with more workers still vulnerable to age
discrimination, it is even more important to clarify laws governing
their treatment in the workplace.
II. EMPLOYERS PUT IN A CHALLENGING POSITION WHEN
CONDUCTING RIFS
Enacting RIF programs can present difficulties for employers,
particularly regarding the creation of OWBPA-mandated age
disclosures needed for exit incentive or other termination
programs.100 The purpose of age disclosures is to inform the selected
employee of how many other employees, ages forty or older, were
selected for termination. Despite the statutory requirements, the
disclosure included in a release agreement can be ambiguous or even
misleading.101
This Part outlines the effect of disclosures on the knowing and
voluntary nature of a terminated employee’s age waiver. It also
highlights the issues courts have struggled with when attempting to
clarify ambiguities of the OWBPA requirements. The diverging
processes taken by courts when evaluating this standard can lead to
differing outcomes, leaving both employees and employers
vulnerable.
Section II.A delves into three principal ambiguities in the
OWBPA: how to define job classification or organizational units, the
substance of disclosure requirements, and which courts qualify as
courts of competent jurisdiction. Section II.B discusses the influence
the OWBPA has had over the various ways courts determine whether
waivers of analogous anti-discrimination protections, such as those
under Title VII or the ADA, are made knowingly and voluntarily.
These sections intend to demonstrate how employers are given
ambiguous guidance regarding a compliant RIF, placing them in a
precarious position.

99. Id.
100. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(H) (2012).
101. See generally Raczak v. Ameritech Corp., 103 F.3d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir. 1997);
Griffin v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 62 F.3d 368, 371 (11th Cir. 1995); Pagliolo v.
Guidant Corp., 483 F. Supp. 2d 847 (D. Minn. 2007).
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A. Less-than-Clear Requirements Under the OWBPA
Though the OWBPA was passed about twenty-six years ago, courts
are still construing the most detailed subpart of the waiver section,
which regulates information disclosures in group terminations.102

1.

Job Classification or Organizational Units

In particular, the language in the waiver provision of § 626(f)(1)(H)
tends to generate a considerable amount of confusion among both
employers and employees.103 This section specifies that when an
employer requests a waiver as part of an exit incentive program or
other employment termination program, the employer must inform
the individual in writing of:
(i) any class, unit, or group of individuals covered by such program,
any eligibility factors for such program, and any time limits
applicable to such program; and (ii) the job titles and ages of all
individuals eligible or selected for the program, and the ages of all
individuals in the same job classification or organizational unit who
are not eligible or selected for the program.104

The exact scope and manner in which an employer defines the class
or unit is unclear, as are specific disclosure requirements.

a.

Defining “Job Classification or Organizational Unit”

To aid in defining the unit of individuals covered by a reduction
program, the EEOC issued a regulation in 1998 to clarify the
OWBPA’s required disclosure of the job titles and ages of all
employees eligible or selected for the program, as well as the ages of
all employees in the same job classification or organizational unit who
are not eligible or selected for the program.105 According to the
regulation, a job classification or organizational unit is determined by
examining the “decisional unit” at issue.106 The term “decisional
unit,” a term created by the EEOC, has been developed to reflect the
in-scope, broad population for an exercise in which an employer
selects and rules out individuals for participation.107
The EEOC regulation gives examples of decisional units ranging
from an entire facility to a group of employees who report to the
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See, e.g., Raczak, 103 F.3d at 1259; Griffin, 62 F.3d at 371.
See Raczak, 103 F.3d at 1268.
29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(H)(i)–(ii).

Id. § 626(f)(1)(H)(ii).

29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(f)(1)(iii)(C) (2017).

See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(f)(3).

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

856

[Vol. XLV

same person.108 It is clear from both the text of the statute and the
EEOC regulation that employers have significant discretion to
determine an organizational unit under § 626(f)(1)(H)(ii).109
Commentators have emphasized that too much employer discretion
to define the organizational unit could lead to inaccurate
disclosure.110 Likewise, concerns remain that ambiguous disclosure
requirements make it difficult for terminated older workers to
understand what information the disclosure is revealing. Often
employees do not know, either in technical or in precise terms,
whether they belong to a certain “class,” “unit,” or a “group” of
employees.111 Without this knowledge, it can be challenging for a
terminated older worker to make sense of a disclosure, let alone to
recognize if he or she has a valid ADEA claim.

b.

Conflicting Court Approaches

Despite somewhat sparse case law on this issue, there are a few
federal and state cases that illustrate the conflict among courts as to
how to interpret § 626(f)(1)(H)(ii). This legal uncertainty has
potentially serious consequences for employers: disclosing too much
or too little job classification or organizational unit data in a release
could lead to the release being invalidated under the OWBPA. Since
there is little case law regarding how to define a decisional unit—and
so few cases are brought by the EEOC to federal court relating to
ADEA claims—employers are stuck operating in the dark.112
Prior to the EEOC’s 1998 regulation, the Eleventh Circuit adopted
a broad conception of a “job classification or organizational unit” in
Griffin v. Kraft General Foods, Inc.113 by relying on the spirit of the
ADEA, generally. In Griffin, the court addressed whether employees
108. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(f)(3)(iii)(A), (iv)(A) (providing an example of
an entire facility being a decisional unit), with 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(f)(3)(iii)(D),
(iv)(D) (providing an example of decisional unit being employees reporting to a
singular manager).
109. See Jon Hyman, Defining the Proper Decisional Unit Is Key in
Legitimacy of RIFs, OHIO EMPLOYER’S L. BLOG (June 12, 2008),
http://www.ohioemployerlawblog.com/2008/06/defining-proper-decisional-unit-iskey.html [http://perma.cc/SC2G-9MY3].
110. Id.; see also Raczak v. Ameritech Corp., 103 F.3d 1257, 1263 (1997) (regarding
organizational units, as this case was decided pre-1998 EEOC guidance, “ . . . it is
certainly possible that an employer will want to fiddle with the definition to mask the
possible evidence for age discrimination”).
111. See generally Griffin v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 62 F.3d 368, 371 (11th Cir.
1995).
112. See EEOC Litigation Statistics, supra note 74.
113. 62 F.3d at 368.
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in the same job classification or organizational unit could include
employees outside a single facility.114 A group of terminated
employees from a closed Kraft Food plant sued under the ADEA on
a theory that Kraft improperly defined the job classification or
organizational unit as including the plant that remained open, leaving
selected employees with little understanding of the waiver to which
they were asked to consent.115 In denying the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment, the Eleventh Circuit stated that an issue of fact
existed as to whether Kraft under-disclosed the organizational unit by
not including all individuals considered, including those at separate
plants.116 The court observed that neither job classification nor
organizational unit was clearly defined in the OWBPA, and instead
relied upon the broad remedial purpose of the ADEA to require the
disclosure of the names of individuals considered in each of its
plants.117
The 1998 EEOC guidance on the subject informed employers that
regardless of the type of program, the scope of the terms “class,”
“unit,” “group,” “job classification,” and “organizational unit” is
determined by examining the “decisional unit” at issue.118 This
guidance still generated confusion, as different courts have relied on
various aspects of the EEOC guidance and the plain text of the
ADEA when attempting to define a “decisional unit.” For example,
in Pagliolo v. Guidant Corp.,119 the District Court of Minnesota relied
on the requirement that information be conveyed “in writing in a
manner calculated to be understood by the average participant” when
determining the proper decisional unit, and the court held that the
resulting release was invalid because it was objectively confusing to
the average employee eligible for the plan.120 In this case, the
Guidant Corporation, which at one time operated eighty-five
different facilities throughout the United States, conducted a RIF as a
result of a shortfall in revenues.121 Guidant considered more than
8,700 employees to be part of the RIF and selection, itself, impacted
around 700.122 The company considered its “decisional unit” to be

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 372.
Id. at 371–72.
Id. at 373.
Id. at 372.
29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(f)(1)(iii)(C) (2017).
483 F. Supp. 2d 847 (D. Minn. 2007).
Id. at 858 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(H)(i) (2012)).
Id. at 851.
Id. at 852.
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nearly all U.S.-based employees because “these employees were
covered by the program and thus considered for termination in the
RIF and for eligibility in the Severance Plan.”123 The court held that
by listing nearly all U.S.-based employees, the employer did not
properly disclose the decisional unit because conveying the names of
so many individuals likely confused the average individual eligible for
such a program.124 As a result, the release was invalid.125
The Northern District Court of Iowa took a different approach in
Behr v. AADG, Inc.126 and held that the defendant-employer’s
classification of “decisional unit” was proper because it accurately
reflected the group from which the employer selected employees to
terminate.127 The plaintiff argued that the defendant-employer
improperly labeled its RIF decisional unit as the “indirect labor
group” when in reality the decisional unit was much smaller.128 The
defendant contended that the decisional unit was indeed all 175
employees in the “indirect labor group,” because plan management
was instructed to reduce headcount of only employees in that specific
group, and the employees in the direct production group were
ineligible.129
The defendant identified fourteen employees to
terminate, thirteen of whom were over forty.130 Defendant mailed
each terminated employee an Exhibit A, which listed the fourteen
selected employees by age and title, and an Exhibit B, consisting of a
list of the ages of the 161 employees not selected.131 The court held
that since the defendant only considered the indirect production
employees, and that the plant employees clearly understood the terms
of the “indirect labor group” to mean not the direct production
employees, the decisional unit was proper.132
All three of these cases rely on different aspects of the OWBPA
and the ADEA when determining job classification or organizational
unit. The appropriateness of a job classification or organizational unit
can vary based on the rationale on which a court relies: whether it is
in the spirit of the ADEA, if a decisional unit is conveyed in a manner

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 857–58.
Id. at 858.
Id.
No. 14-CV-3075-CJW, 2016 WL 4119692 (N.D. Iowa July 29, 2016).

Id. at *15.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *14.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *14.
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understood by the average participant, or how RIF selections were
made. Consistency in this area would provide clarity.

2.

Disclosure Requirements

The substantive elements required in an age disclosure are
similarly unclear, despite EEOC regulations interpreting the text of
the OWBPA. The EEOC regulations include the following salient
provisions:
Information regarding ages should be broken down by age of those
eligible and selected as well as ages of those not eligible or selected.
Age bands broader than 1 year are not appropriate.
If the RIF includes employees terminated over various levels within
the organization or with varying job titles, that information must be
broken down by grade level or some other type of subcategory.
If the disclosures combine information regarding voluntary and
involuntary terminations, the employer must make clear which
employees were part of which program.
If selected employees are from a subset of a decisional unit, the
employer still must disclose the entire decisional unit (i.e. if a 10%
RIF is done in the Accounting Department under the direction that
the bottom 1/3 will be terminated, the employer must still disclose
information for all of the employees within that department).133

In Behr, the plaintiffs contended that the Separation Agreement
did not contain the eligibility factors that the employer considered
when making RIF selections, in violation of § 626(f)(1)(A) and
§ 626(f)(1)(H)(i), which requires disclosure of “eligibility factors for
such program.”134 Defendant’s director of human resources testified
that those selected in the RIF were selected for “many different
reasons,” none of which were listed in the waiver.135 The district
court held that it is sufficient for an employer to identify the group
eligible for termination and that the employer is not required to
identify the specific factors guiding which eligible employees to
terminate based on the model waiver included in the regulation.136
According to the regulation, an employer fulfills the eligibility factor
by simply stating that “[a]ll persons in the [decisional unit] are eligible
133. See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(f)(4)(i)–(vii) (2017).
134. Behr, 2016 WL 4119692, at *4 (stating that if a waiver is in connection with an
exit incentive program, the employer must disclose “any class, unit, or group of
individuals covered by such program, any eligibility factors for such program, and any
time limits applicable to such program,” respectively).
135. Id. at *12.
136. Id. at *14.
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for the program.”137 The regulation seems to directly contradict a
requirement of the statutory text, which understandably leads to
disclosure requirement confusion.
The Behr decision held that a disclosure must be meaningful to be
valid, and that merely adhering to the actual text of the OWBPA will
not protect an employer from a lawsuit.138 Further, in Behr, the
defendant-employer believed that it was not required to disclose
information related to employees not selected for the RIF because
“job titles” is missing from the second part of the following OWBPA
provision: “(ii) the job titles and ages of all individuals eligible or
selected for the program, and the ages of all individuals in the same
classification or organizational unit who are not eligible or selected
for the program.”139 The court held that although an employer did
not have to provide the job titles of every employee not selected, it
had to provide enough data to inform the employee of comparative
information in an understandable manner.140 The court went on to
explain that the primary purpose of a disclosure was to inform the
terminated employee of possible age discrimination claims, and the
data provided by the employer in this case was not meaningful.141
As evidenced, regulations that contradict statutory text create
judicial uncertainty in whether to adhere to statutory text, leaving
employers vulnerable to ADEA suits based on this confusion.

3.

“Court of Competent Jurisdiction”

Courts disagree as to which forums constitute a “court of
competent jurisdiction” in which an ADEA case may be heard. The
text of the OWBPA requires that an employer prove the validity of a
waiver in a “court of competent jurisdiction,” but provides no
definition for this crucial term.142 Further complicating the issue, a
provision passed as part of the 1978 amendment to the ADEA states
that “any person aggrieved may bring a civil action in any court of
competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will
effectuate the purposes of this Act . . . .”143 Without a clear definition
of a “court of competent jurisdiction,” employers and employees
alike face considerable confusion as, oftentimes, forum can affect the
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(f)(4)(vii)(B).

See generally Behr, 2016 WL 4119692, at *16.
See id. at *9–10 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(H)(ii) (2012)).
Id. at *16.
Id.
29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(3).

Id. § 626(c)(1).
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outcome of a case.144 The Supreme Court addressed this confusion in
Gilmer and found that Congress did not intend to preclude a waiver
of judicial access based on the language of the 1978 amendment of
§ 626(c)(1).145 As a result, an ADEA claim can be subject to
compulsory arbitration and heard by an arbitrator rather than in
court or by a judge. Despite this ruling, lower courts have found
some exceptions to this general rule.146
When presented with a similar issue, the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota in McLeod v. General Mills,
Inc.147 ascertained congressional intent based on the language of
another provision of the OWBPA, § 626(f)(3), which states that “the
party asserting the validity of a waiver shall have the burden of
proving in a court of competent jurisdiction that a waiver was
knowing and voluntary.”148 The McLeod court held that the plain
language of the OWBPA requires ADEA waiver cases to be tried in
court, not through arbitration, reasoning that because Gilmer rested
on § 626(c)(1), there was room within § 626(f)(3) to hold otherwise.149
First, the plain language of § 626(f)(3)—by using the term “shall” in
particular—was very different from § 626(c)(1) (which uses the word
“may”), and a court must presume that Congress deliberately chose
to include “shall” in some provisions and not others.150 Second,
under the plain language of the statute, a “court of competent
jurisdiction” must refer to a court, not—as General Mills tried to
argue—an arbitral forum.151
Thus, McLeod indicates that what constitutes a “court of
competent jurisdiction” is unresolved, especially where a case
involves multiple ADEA claims—waiver and non-waiver. The
McLeod court held, however, that its conclusion was limited by the
“narrow circumstances presented in this case: a dispute over the
validity of a waiver of substantive claims under the OWBPA’s waiver
requirements found in [§] 626(f)(1).”152 This ambiguity creates
confusion for both employers and employees regarding where an
ADEA case can be heard and should be resolved.
144. See infra Section III.B.3.
145. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1990).
146. Compare Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26, with McLeod v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 140 F. Supp.
3d 843, 855 (D. Minn. 2015).
147. 140 F. Supp. 3d 843.
148. Id. at 851.
149. Id. at 853–54.
150. Id. at 855.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 855–56.
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Furthering the Confusion: The Knowing and Voluntary Standard
for Other Anti-Discrimination Statutes

While the pre-OWBPA approaches to determining the knowing
and voluntary standard informed the statutory floor of the OWBPA
requirements, these approaches nevertheless remain in use by some
courts across the country when determining whether other antidiscrimination protections are knowingly and voluntarily waived by
terminated employees. Without a clear knowing and voluntary
standard, employees may not be as aware of the rights they are
waiving when signing a release agreement as they are when waiving
age-related claims. Further, employers are left guessing as to how
they will effectuate a compliant RIF program. With clearer standards
comes increased predictability for both employees and employers.
Generally, a waiver of discrimination claims is valid when the
employee knowingly and voluntarily consents to the waiver.153 For
waivers under the ADEA, as has been described at length above,
courts look to the statutory provisions outlined in the OWBPA.154
Under Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes, however, the
validity of a knowing and voluntary waiver is governed solely by case
law.155 When evaluating a waiver of claims arising under Title VII or
the ADA, for example, some courts rely on traditional contract
principles to determine whether a waiver is knowing and voluntary,
but most look to the totality of the circumstances.156 The issue of not
having a clearly articulated knowing and voluntary standard for the
waiver of non-age-related claims is well described by Professor Daniel
P. O’Gorman:
Not only are the circuits in disarray, each of the tests applied by
them is in disarray. Courts applying the totality of the circumstances
test, a test that focuses more on the releasing person’s state of mind
than a strict contract law test, often apply contract rules, which are

153. See UNDERSTANDING WAIVERS OF DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS, supra note 47, at
pt. III.
154. See, e.g., Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 427 (1998) (stating
“the [OWBPA] creates a series of prerequisites for knowing and voluntary waivers
and imposes affirmative duties of disclosure and waiting periods”); Am. Airlines, Inc.
v. Cardoza-Rodriguez, 133 F.3d 111, 117 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting that Congress
enacted the OWBPA to resolve whether the “totality of the circumstances” or
“ordinary contract principles” was proper to determine “knowing and voluntary” by
amending the ADEA to mandate that an ADEA waiver contain certain minimum
information).
155. See UNDERSTANDING WAIVERS OF DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS, supra note 47, at
pt. III.
156. See id.
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generally objective rules focusing on what a person says and does,
not what he or she thinks. Courts applying the contract law test
often look at factors used under the totality of the circumstances
test, despite such factors usually being irrelevant under contract law
principles.157

The OWBPA has had a substantial impact on how waivers of Title
VII, the ADA, and other non-age discrimination claims are being
analyzed by courts,158 though there is currently no official rule
regarding whether courts should apply the “totality of the
circumstances” approach or the general contract law approach when
determining their validity.159 In July of 2009, the EEOC released a
guidance document summarizing case law in this area, concluding that
courts determine whether a waiver of rights under Title VII or the
ADA was knowing and voluntary by looking to factors nearly
identical to those in the OWBPA.160 This document is indicative of
the OWBPA’s reach beyond age-related protections and perhaps
foreshadows the future of waiver provision law for other antidiscrimination statutes.161 This influence only reinforces the need for
clarity and predictability.

157. Daniel P. O’Gorman, A State of Disarray: The “Knowing and Voluntary”
Standard for Releasing Claims Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 78 (2005). O’Gorman further explained that in the
context of a Title VII waiver, the central issue is whether a Title VII release should
be viewed as a waiver of a fundamental or contractual right. Id. If Title VII is
determined to be a fundamental right, a more subjective test should be applied, such
as the “actual intent” theory that focuses on whether the parties had a subjective
meeting of the minds to determine whether a contract was formed. Id. If Title VII is
determined to be a contractual right, a more contractual or objective test would be
applied, focusing on what the parties said and did, not what they thought. Id. The
objective theory has prevailed. Id.
158. See generally UNDERSTANDING WAIVERS OF DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS, supra
note 47.
159. See O’Gorman, supra note 157, at 74–75.
160. UNDERSTANDING WAIVERS OF DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS, supra note 47, at
pt. III.1 (“These courts consider the following circumstances and conditions under
which the waiver was signed: whether it was written in a manner that was clear and
specific enough for the employee to understand based on his education and business
experience; whether it was induced by fraud, duress, undue influence, or other
improper conduct by the employer; whether the employee had enough time to read
and think about the advantages and disadvantages of the agreement before signing it;
whether the employee consulted with an attorney or was encouraged or discouraged
by the employer from doing so; whether the employee had any input in negotiating
the terms of the agreement; and whether the employer offered the employee
consideration (e.g., severance pay, additional benefits) that exceeded what the
employee already was entitled to by law or contract and the employee accepted the
offered consideration.”).
161. See infra Section III.B.2.
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III. PROPOSING A NEW KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY STANDARD
This Part both recognizes the successes of the OWBPA and
proposes new EEOC regulations to bring further clarity to the
OWBPA. Additionally, it proposes that the formal structure of the
OWBPA be extended to other anti-discrimination statutes to ensure
that employees receive all material information possible before
waiving any discrimination claim in the case of a layoff or incentivized
termination.
The OWBPA has not only had a powerful impact on older
workers, attributable in part to its relatively straightforward structure
and clarity, but it also has improved protections for any employee
subject to RIFs or other similar programs.162 According to a partner
at a prominent plaintiffs’ law firm, the OWBPA has even had a
positive ripple effect on those under age forty due to its
transformation of the consideration periods and revocation rights for
all employees signing these agreements, regardless of age.163 The
partner explained that because employers must abide by the waiver
requirements in the OWBPA during a group termination, some tend
to follow the same OWBPA standard for all employees involved in
that particular termination for simplicity’s sake.164 For example,
employees receive the same time period in which to return their
waiver and are encouraged to speak to an attorney before signing.
Therefore, those under age forty receive some of the benefits of
OWBPA in the group layoff context as well but rarely, if ever, receive
specific disclosures.165
A. Making the OWBPA Even More Effective: Clarifying Salient
Waiver Provisions
The OWBPA’s relative clarity is one of the reasons for its
success.166 By providing employers with disclosure responsibilities,
compliance appears to be within arm’s reach. However, this is rarely
the case, and further clarity in a number of salient waiver provisions
could make this statute even more effective, an important goal given
its ever-growing importance and influence.

162. See Telephone Interview with Partner, Unnamed Plaintiffs’ Law Firm
(Oct. 25, 2016) (notes on file with author).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See generally UNDERSTANDING WAIVERS OF DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS, supra
note 47.
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Increasing Mandated Disclosure in RIF Exhibits

The below proposal is intended to remove the secrecy of the RIF
selection process, keep employees informed regarding the program,
and, as a result, encourage reduction of discrimination suits.
Defining “decisional unit” in a RIF exercise within a large
corporation has proven challenging, and, as a result, further EEOC
regulations should be issued to alleviate the confusion.167 Currently,
the EEOC mandates disclosure of the job titles and ages of those in
the “decisional unit.”168 This instruction provides room for employers
to manipulate who makes up a “decisional unit,” which could lead to
inaccurate disclosure and the ability to lawfully conceal potential age
discrimination.169 The EEOC should issue guidance aimed at tying
the definition of “job classification and organizational unit” directly
to management structure by mandating disclosure of not just job title
and age, but also of corporate organizational data.
First, the issue of defining “job classification and organizational
unit” is an understandably difficult one because RIF selections can
occur in a number of ways: employees can be compared against each
other on a subunit level or on a larger, departmental level. For
example, fictional Company X, as outlined in Figure 1, contains the
Legal and Compliance Super Department, which can be further
broken down into the Legal Department and the Compliance
Department.
There are several subunits within the Legal
Department, such as the employment law group, the tax group, and
the litigation group.

167. See generally id. at pt. IV.
168. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(f)(4)(iii) (2017) (“In a termination of persons in several
established grade levels and/or other established subcategories within a job category
or job title, the information shall be broken down by grade level or other
subcategory.”).
169. See Raczak v. Ameritech Corp., 103 F.3d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir. 1997); Hyman,
supra note 109.
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Figure 1. Fictional Company X Organizational Chart Broken down
by Super Department, Department, and Subunit
Legal and Compliance
Super Department

Legal Department

Compliance
Department

Tax Subunit

Employment Law
Subunit

Litigation Subunit

If a ten-percent RIF was mandated on Company X, which has over
50,000 employees in the United States, determining the decisional
unit to be all 50,000 employees could seem preposterous. However,
that massive disclosure could technically be considered a decisional
unit because it is the portion of the employer’s organizational
structure considered as part of the RIF.170 Employers are unlikely to
disclose that much information and courts have ruled that doing so
might actually invalidate the release entirely.171 The ambiguity of the
“decisional unit” definition under current regulations allows
170. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(f)(1)(iv)(3)(i)(B) (“A ‘decisional unit’ is that portion of
the employer’s organizational structure from which the employer chose the persons
who would be offered consideration for the signing of a waiver and those who would
not be offered consideration for the signing of a waiver. The term ‘decisional unit’
has been developed to reflect the process by which an employer chose certain
employees for a program and ruled out others from that program.”); see also Behr v.
AADG, Inc., No. 14-CV-3075-CJW, 2016 WL 4119692, at *15 (N.D. Iowa July 29,
2016) (holding that regardless of size, the EEOC regulation that defined decisional
unit as the group from which the employer chose the persons affected was proper).
171. See Pagliolo v. Guidant Corp., 483 F. Supp. 2d 847, 859 (D. Minn. 2007).
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companies to disclose a decisional unit that selectively reveals the
most favorable statistical data for the employer, possibly hiding
disparate impact red flags.172
A clearer way to define “decisional unit” would be to uncover the
exact senior management directive for the RIF, and to tie managerial
structure to the definition of “decisional unit.” This proposal is
exactly in line with the 1998 EEOC Regulation on the issue,173 but
specifically emphasizes the decision-making process in determining
the appropriate unit. The purpose of such an emphasis is to provide
consistency.
Anchoring all organizational unit composition to
management decision-making is the most clear, common indicator of
working groups across workplaces.
To illustrate, consider a common RIF scenario in which the head of
the Legal and Compliance Super Department within fictional
Company X assigned his direct reports (the heads of the Legal
Department and the Compliance Department) the responsibility of
determining who to select as part of the ten-percent RIF. Further
suppose that the head of the Legal Department then delegated that
responsibility to the heads of the Tax, Employment Law, and
Litigation subunits and asked that they recommend specific
individuals to be terminated, subject to his oversight and ultimate
sign-off. The individuals within the Legal Department should be
considered the “decisional unit” because the head of the Legal
Department ultimately signed off on his direct report’s selections.
Defining “decisional unit” based on which manager ultimately
signed-off on the selected individuals would create a more clear-cut
rule. Functionally speaking, a manager who has ultimate authority
needs to have a working knowledge of who is selected and why, which
in large companies simply could not be a CEO or Super Department
head. This would help preclude problematic over-disclosures because
a company could not persuasively argue that one individual was
responsible for determining all of the terminations in a large-scale
RIF program. This would also avoid under-disclosure issues, because
ultimate sign-off would not be done at a highly localized level as
lower-level employees are generally not entrusted with that authority.
Guidance that mandates disclosure of not just job title and age, but
also organizational-related data, would further help clarify
“decisional unit” for the selected employees. Selected employees
172. See generally Raczak, 103 F.3d at 1263.
173. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(f)(1)(iv)(3)(i)(B) (1998) (“When identifying the scope of
the ‘class, unit, or group,’ and ‘job classification or organizational unit,’ an employer
should consider its organizational structure and decision-making process.”).
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would receive enough information to be able to essentially re-create
the organizational structure of which they were members. This recreation allows the average employee to understand the applicable
“decisional unit” without confusion.
If an employee in the
Employment Law subunit of Company X was selected, for example,
the disclosure would contain not only job title and age of those in the
“decisional unit,” but also subunit data and department data. A
plaintiff’s attorney could then evaluate if there was age discrimination
at the subunit or department level, which is impossible to determine
in a disclosure issued pursuant to current EEOC guidance.

2.

Clarifying “Eligibility Factors”

EEOC regulations should be issued to refine the definition of
“eligibility factors” to include what criteria, such as job performance,
experience, or seniority, an employer relied on in determining RIF
selection.174 The EEOC regulations currently only include the
generic statement, “[a]ll persons in the Construction Division are
eligible for the program” as an example of an acceptable eligibility
factor disclosure, which gives employees little actual knowledge about
selection criteria and could enable employers to easily disguise
discriminatory motives.175 Employers may be concealing important
information from those who are receiving these waivers. By
redefining “eligibility factors” to include the factors that the employer
considered when selecting RIF participants, employees selected
would get important information that would inform their knowledge
of the validity of an age discrimination claim under the ADEA.

3.

Keeping Age Claims in a Court of Law

Lastly, an ADEA waiver case should be handled in a court of law,
not by an arbitrator. Thus, this Note proposes that a court should
focus on the plain language of § 626(f)(3) and not look to the
language of § 626(c)(1) as the Gilmer Court did.176 This proposal is
consistent with literature that suggests that employees have fared
much worse in arbitration of statutory employment claims than in
judicially-managed claims.177 It is also consistent with the passage of
174. See Pagliolo, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 860–61.
175. See generally Behr v. AADG, Inc., No. 14-CV-3075-CJW, 2016 WL 4119692,
at *14 (N.D. Iowa July 29, 2016).
176. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23–24 (1990).
177. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration:
Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury? 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 412–13
(2007).
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the ADEA, generally, as Congress has made clear through that
statute that age waivers deserve enhanced protection;178 thus, it
follows that such litigation should be handled in this manner as a
result of many policy considerations, elaborated on below.
In addition to its role in reducing valuable case law that could
clarify the OWBPA, arbitration of ADEA claims can be problematic
for three additional policy reasons, all of which harm employee
protections. The issues of the repeat player bias, employee win rates,
and employee recovery figures all point in the direction of arbitration
not being a “court of competent jurisdiction” for purposes of
litigating age-related claims.179 The repeat player bias is based on the
concept that a party that participates in a conflict resolution process
multiple times will have an advantage over a party that participates
only once.180 With regard to employment arbitration, there is concern
that employers will have an advantage as repeat players because they
will likely participate in multiple arbitration cases, whereas the
employees will likely participate in only one.181 “Given that
employment arbitrators rely on being selected to decide cases for
their livelihood, the danger is that arbitrators will have a bias in favor
of the repeat player employer in hope of being selected by the
employer to hear future cases.”182 In a study conducted by Lisa
Bingham in the 1990s, “employers who participated in multiple
arbitration cases were significantly more likely to win their case than
employers who only participated in a single case.”183 For the repeat
players, the employee win rate was 23.3% and for the non-repeat
players, the employee win rate was 67%.184 Though evidence
indicating that such a bias exists is limited, it does suggest that further
investigation into these discrepancies is warranted.185
In a 2011 study comparing overall trial outcomes in mandatory
arbitration and litigation conducted by Professor Alexander Colvin,
from the Industrial and Labor Relations School at Cornell University,
and Professor Katherine Stone, from the UCLA School of Law,
employee win rates are much lower in mandatory arbitration than

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

See S. REP. NO. 101-79 at 968 (1989).
See generally Colvin, supra note 177, at 406.
See id. at 427.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 428–29.
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they are in either federal or state court.186 The study found that
employees in mandatory arbitration win 21.4% of the time, compared
to 36.4% in federal court and 57% in state courts.187 This conclusion is
particularly problematic in the face of the Supreme Court’s rationale
for the holding in Gilmer, that “by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory
claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the
statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial, forum.”188 That sentiment seems to not necessarily be true
given that the outcome of a litigated right will likely be different if
argued in one forum over the other.189 The purpose of the ADEA,
after all, is to prohibit age discrimination in employment by
protecting the rights of older workers.190 Without consistency in
outcome, the purpose of the Act is thwarted.
Lastly, the issue of damages favors keeping ADEA claims out of
arbitration.191 According to Colvin and Stone’s study, the differences
in damages awarded in arbitration versus federal or state courts are
significant.192 A typical mandatory arbitration award is only twentyone percent of the median award in the federal courts and forty-three
percent of the median award in the state courts.193 In order to ensure
that the ADEA is fulfilling its purpose, employers must be faced with
some degree of discipline should they not comply with the statute.
Bringing ADEA claims to arbitration weakens the deterrent effect of
the Act because employee awards are significantly lower than they
would have been if brought to court.
Genuine concern exists around the neutrality of the arbitration
forum. As a result, such claims should be litigated in the most neutral
legal forum. This is consistent with Congress’ desire to hold agerelated waiver claims to the higher knowing and voluntary
standard.194

186. KATHERINE V.W. STONE & ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, THE ARBITRATION
EPIDEMIC: MANDATORY ARBITRATION DEPRIVES WORKERS AND CONSUMERS OF
THEIR RIGHTS, ECON. POL’Y INST. 3 (2015).
187. Id. at 20.
188. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1990).
189. See Colvin, supra note 177, at 420–21.
190. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2012) (“It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to
promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to
prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers
find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment.”).
191. See generally Colvin, supra note 177, at 420–24.
192. See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 186, at 21.
193. See id. at 20.
194. See S. REP. NO. 101-79, at 968 (1989).
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The Future of the Knowing and Voluntary Standard

This Note proposes that Congress adopt an OWBPA-like waiver
rule for other anti-discrimination statutes, such as Title VII and the
ADA, to resolve the issue of how the knowing and voluntary
standard should be interpreted when waiving these rights.195 The
following section will specifically address only Title VII and the
ADA; this Note, however, does not propose that the change stops
there. Instead, this Note uses these two statutes as a starting point for
what could be an evolution in how courts evaluate the knowing and
voluntary standard for waivers. This Note highlights Title VII and
the ADA due to the volume of individuals that the statutes protect
and the likely probability that employers will have this information
available about their workforces to include in a disclosure.
Because it would be preposterous for an employer to offer a race
or sex-based exit incentive program, this Note proposes that in the
context of large-scale RIF programs, § 626(f)(1) should become
standard text required in all anti-discrimination statutes.196 Professor
Cynthia Estlund, from New York University School of Law,
introduced a similar theory that the OWBPA should serve as a
“useful legal template for regulating the waiver of other existing
employment claims,” but stated so merely in passing.197
As mentioned in Part II, “totality of the circumstances” factors
were the basis of the disclosure factors enumerated under the
OWBPA.198 Both age and non-age discrimination claims were
evaluated under similar factors prior to the passage of the OWBPA,
such as whether the employee who released his claims was
represented by an attorney, whether the settlement was in writing,
and whether the language in the settlement was clear to the
employee.199 Recognizing that the origin of many of the OWBPA

195. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration
Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law,

155 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 442 (2006) (“[I]n practice, the OWBPA is serving as a
broader template: because ADEA claims may be included in the single broad waiver
that employers often seek from employees at the time of severance, employers are
well advised to, and often do, follow the relatively stringent standard of the
OWBPA.”).
196. Under this proposal, 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(H) would read: “if a waiver is
requested in connection with an employment termination program offered . . . ”
[emphasis added].
197. See Estlund, supra note 195, at 442.
198. See UNDERSTANDING WAIVERS OF DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS, supra note 47, at
pt. III–IV.
199. See DiMartino v. City of Hartford, 636 F. Supp. 1241, 1247 (D. Conn. 1986).
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factors came from the “totality of the circumstances” test suggests
that enumerating the waiver requirements of other antidiscrimination statutes that also rely on the “totality of
circumstances” test for enforcement would be logical.200
One critical aspect of the OWBPA that deviates from the typical
“totality of the circumstances” analysis is the use of disclosures.201
Age disclosures under the ADEA should be modified to fit waivers
covering other claims of discrimination to ensure that terminated
employees have enough information to adequately determine if they
would like to waive those rights. For example, under Title VII, a
requirement mandating the disclosure of gender, race, and ethnicity
of those terminated would be useful. The definition of “decisional
unit” would remain the same as the one this Note proposes above, but
instead of simply disclosing the ages and groups within which the
employee was selected, other demographic information would be
included. This would extend to the ADA as well. If an employer
would like a terminated employee to waive any ADA claim, the
employer would be required to include a disclosure of those who fall
under the ADA’s protection within the “decisional unit” from which
the terminated employee was selected. The knowing and voluntary
standard would, therefore, be elevated under this proposed disclosure
system, just like it has under the OWBPA. This proposal places a
higher burden on employers to strongly consider and monitor the
make-up of their workforces, because such information will be
disclosed in a layoff.
To put this portion of the proposal in context with the proposal for
a more robust disclosure, Figure 2 outlines a sample excerpt of an
ideal release agreement disclosure based on the Company X example.
Not only is age disclosed in the release exhibit, but sex, race, and
ethnicity are as well.

200. See generally id.
201. See generally UNDERSTANDING WAIVERS OF DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS, supra
note 47.
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Figure 2. Fictional Company X Release Agreement Disclosure

Release Agreement Disclosure
Company X
Scope of RIF: 10 firm-wide reduction
Selection criteria: low-performers
Decisional unit: department-level
Selected/
Not Selected
Selected
Not Selected
Not Selected

Job Title

Age

Sex

Race/ethnicity

Disability

Department

Subunit

Attorney
Attorney
Paralegal

44
48
26

Female
Female
Male

Puerto Rican
Asian
White

No
Yes
No

Legal
Legal
Legal

Tax
Tax
Tax

Selected
Selected
Not Selected
…

Attorney
Paralegal
Attorney
…

50
35
42
…

Male
Female
Female
…

African American
Native Hawaiian
White
…

Yes
Yes
Yes
…

Legal
Legal
Legal
…

Employment
Litigation
Litigation
…

*… signifies that there would be further disclosures (the above is just a snapshot of a few of the
individuals in the decisional unit)

Under this proposal, Title VII disclosure would be limited to
organizations required by the EEOC to file EEO-1 reports since it
would be difficult, from an information-gathering perspective, for
smaller organizations to mandate disclosure of race, ethnicity, and
gender of its employees.202 All companies that meet the following
criteria are required to file the EEO-1 report annually: (1) subject to
Title VII with 100 or more employees; (2) subject to Title VII with
fewer than 100 employees if the company is owned by or corporately
affiliated with another company and the entire enterprise employs a
total of 100 or more employees; or (3) federal government prime
contracts or first-tier subcontractors with fifty or more employees and
a prime contractor or first-tier subcontract amount to $50,000 or
more.203 Under this proposal, organizations already required to
produce EEO-1 reports would be obligated, in the context of a RIF,

202. See EEO-1 Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeo1survey/faq.cfm#About
[http://perma.cc/V2L5-2GWV] (“The EEO-1 Report is a compliance survey
mandated by federal statute and regulations requiring company employment data to
be categorized by race/ethnicity, gender and job category.”).
203. Id.
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to disclose gender, race, and ethnicity information in a release
agreement exhibit.
Regarding ADA disclosures, instead of sharing details about an
employee’s specific disability, this Note proposes including whether
or not one exists. This Note recognizes the importance of anonymity,
especially when it comes to disability information. However, a simple
yes or no in the “Disability” column of the example disclosure above
will continue to protect employee privacy.
One can argue that this proposal seems lofty, especially from a
monetary perspective because employers would have to bear the cost
of running robust data analytics on RIF decisional units as well as
bear the risk of having to disclose such information. Though this may
be the case, this deeper analysis will force employers to choose who
they select for termination more carefully, and perhaps who they hire
into their organizations as well. Moreover, this proposal may also
save employers time and money in the long run by eliminating
frivolous discrimination suits. With the data required to be disclosed
under this proposal, both the employer and employee would better
know where they stood regarding the merits of any lawsuit.
Employers and terminated employees would spend less time in
discovery and more time evaluating the merits of a case. Thus, this
proposal could be effective on multiple fronts.
CONCLUSION
The OWBPA has been successful because it has disciplined
employers to operate under a system of waiver disclosures with harsh
consequences of non-compliance while also providing employees with
information they need to determine whether an age waiver was made
knowingly and voluntarily. Nevertheless, there is still room for clarity
that could make the OWBPA even more effective. With an
increasing number of older employees in the workforce, the time to
act is now. The most pressing issues involve the currently malleable
definition of “decisional unit,” ambiguous disclosure requirements,
and whether to allow ADEA claims to be arbitrated. Furthermore,
the OWBPA’s codification of knowing and voluntary should be
extended to other anti-discrimination laws such as Title VII and the
ADA. The OWBPA could and should serve as a model for what it
means for an employee to waive his rights knowingly and voluntarily.

